

armed with submachineguns, rifles, and grenades.

Other armed Communist groups were observed on streets and in buildings, including one led by Manuel Gonzalez Gonzalez, Spanish civil war veteran and Cuban intelligence agent.

#### APRIL 25

Anti-rebel forces, which had been badly disorganized, now began to move against the rebel-held area of the city under command of Gen. Elias Wessan y Wessan, head of the Armed Forces Training Center. The Dominican Air Force bombed and strafed rebel-held installations. The ferocity of this and subsequent attacks consolidated public resentment and inadvertently presented the rebels with an effective propaganda weapon.

A large quantity of arms and ammunition had, by this time, fallen into the hands of the Communists. Teams of party members were fanning out through the central part of Santo Domingo organizing paramilitary groups.

Agitators from all three Red parties continued to exhort the mobs. They distributed mimeographed propaganda sheet calling on the people to fight and stating, in part, that "the hour has arrived to give arms to the working class . . . to form common units of soldiers and civilians and to organize people's combat units."

Additional Communist leaders were identified among the armed mobs and in the rebel military forces, including Juan Miguel Roman Diaz, of the ACPI, who participated in the 1963 guerrilla operation, and Jaime Duran Herando, Cuban-trained guerrilla expert.

Gustavo Ricart who returned from Cuba in 1963 bringing money to finance MPD activities, was identified as the commander of another rebel stronghold. Five other Communists were in charge of production of a considerable number of Molotov cocktails during the day.

The leaders of the various Communist parties were well equipped with weapons and became an increasingly important element in the rebel force. Rebel army officers and men, numbering about 1,000 at the outset, were soon greatly outnumbered by armed civilians who, in a state of disorganization, became easy prey for disciplined Communist leadership.

Efforts by the U.S. Embassy toward a cease-fire between the rebels and elements of the Dominican armed forces were unsuccessful. During the day, a large number of American citizens assembled in the Hotel Embajador seeking safety. They requested assistance from the U.S. Embassy in evacuating them from Santo Domingo, which was under bombardment by the Dominican Air Force and was by this time the scene of widespread rifle and artillery fire between the opposing factions. The Embassy secured from the rebel leaders agreement to cooperate in evacuating Americans from the nearby port of Haina. Armed civilian groups, over which the Molina regime had lost control, paid no attention to this agreement.

#### APRIL 27

About 100 armed civilians, hearing over the rebel radio that a prominent Dominican newspaperman and broadcaster, well known as anti-Communist, was at the Hotel Embajador (actually he was not there) went to the hotel and fired several hundred shots. April 27 saw the complete breakdown of law and order. Molina, the so-called provisional president, went to the U.S. Embassy in apparent defeat, accompanied by rebel army leaders, Col. Miguel Angel Hernandez Ramires and Col. Francisco Caamano Dengo. Shortly afterward, Molina abandoned office and took asylum in the Colombian Embassy.

During the day, Lajara Gonzalez of the APCJ arranged for additional arms to be passed to Communists. The offices and

plant of the newspaper *Listin Diario* was taken over by armed PSPD Communists headed by Asdrubal Dominguez Guerrero and Jose Israel Cuello Hernandez, both carrying automatic weapons.

#### APRIL 28

The anti-rebel armed forces commanded by General Wessan established a three-man military junta headed by Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit (air force), Col. Enrique Apolinario Casado Saladin (army) and Capt. Manuel Santana Ocasio (navy). Early in the day, the junta seemed to make progress against the rebels but encountered heavier resistance in the afternoon and lost momentum.

The situation in the city was increasingly tense and confused. Junta forces, tired and disorganized, began to crumble. Armed mobs terrorized the city, firing on homes and other buildings, including the United States and other embassies. With collapse of the Molina government, PRD leaders abdicated their positions of leadership fearing their cause lost and their lives in danger. They left the rebel movement in the hands of politically immature army officers who had lost command over armed civilians who now far outnumbered the rebel army forces. Communist leaders, by then in control of the armed mobs, moved quickly into the political leadership vacuum in Santo Domingo.

Late in the afternoon, the junta and police authorities informed the U.S. Embassy they could no longer assure the safety of American lives. U.S. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett recommended that U.S. Marines be landed to establish a safety perimeter from which Americans and other foreign citizens could be evacuated. By that night, approximately 600 marines were landed and had taken positions around the Hotel Embajador.

#### APRIL 29

The rebels held the central part of the city and retained the military initiative. An armed mob under Communist MPD leaders began a full-scale assault on the remaining police stronghold, Ozama Fortress. The fortress fell next day. Another armed mob sacked the cathedral.

Communists among the university students were active in organizing the crowds.

House-to-house fighting continued. The United States and several other embassies remained under sniper fire. The U.S. Government ordered the landing of an additional 1,100 marines and, during the night of April 29-30, approximately 3,000 troops of the 82d Airborne Division landed at San Isidro. Reinforcements arrived on succeeding days.

Leaders of all three Communist groups met to discuss tactics in the light of new developments. They also met with rebel military officers.

#### APRIL 30

The official rebel radio broadcast instructions to armed mobs not to fire on U.S. troops but firing continued and a number of casualties were inflicted on U.S. personnel.

Two Communist commando groups were particularly active roaming the city looking for targets. Other Communists working closely with rebel army officers included two who received political and guerrilla training in Cuba in 1963.

#### MAY 1

A shaky cease-fire was achieved but snipers were active throughout the day, firing on the U.S. Embassy and U.S. troops. This was in keeping with propaganda emanating from the rebel-held area that the real purpose of the cease-fire was to permit junta forces to reassemble and attack from a sanctuary provided by U.S. troops.

About 50 Communists, probably a high command group of all 3 parties, met in one of the Communist strongpoints fortified with machinegun emplacements on the roof.

#### MAY 2

A shortwave radio transmitter in the home of a Communist broadcast instructions to the civilian mobs to shoot Americans on sight. A large crowd gathered in the Praque Independencia heard a violently anti-American speech from a Communist.

#### MAY 3-4

Rebel leaders began to consider how to give their movement the form and structure of a legitimate government. Communist leaders discussed among themselves the desirability of their top leaders withdrawing from open participation in the rebel movement in order both to support rebel claims that the movement was free of Communist influence and to afford protection to the principal figures of the Communist parties.

Colonel Caamano Dengo, generally regarded as anti-Communist, had said on several occasions during the revolt that he was aware the Communists had been playing an increasingly important role.

#### MAY 5

It was the consensus at meetings of Communist leaders that, while rank-and-file members of the three parties should fight on, prominent Communists should begin withdrawing from the scene. Some went into hiding, others attempted to leave Santo Domingo for towns to the north. One of these was later captured by anti-rebel forces.

Some of the APCJ and PSPD leaders who left Santo Domingo were under instructions to attempt to organize local party members and sympathizers for eventual guerrilla action in the north. False identity cards were prepared for Communist leaders.

MPD leaders also agreed that the more prominent party figures should go under cover for the time being. They further decided that arms and ammunition in the hands of party members should be hidden for possible use in guerrilla operations. Orders were given to secure as many arms as they could and deliver them to party headquarters.

#### Offensive in Vietnam

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

#### HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL

OF ILLINOIS

#### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1965

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, an editorial in the Peoria Journal Star on June 10, 1965, pointed out that the only question involved in Vietnam dealt with our commitment—not our ability. The recent movement of the free world's military forces should remove any doubts or questions the Communists have had regarding our commitment to defend the Republic of South Vietnam. The editorial that I have referred to follows:

#### OFFENSIVE IN VIETNAM

The State Department's formal announcement Tuesday that we are going to provide combat support if requests are made by the South Vietnamese command (whoever that is) would hardly seem to be news because that is what we have been doing for the past couple of years.

What the announcement apparently means is that we are readying a large-scale offensive action which will involve regular American Army and Marine units rather than depend upon limited warfare tactics of our Special Forces and the Vietnamese Army which obviously are failing to stem a Communist takeover of South Vietnam.

If this is the case, we can expect that American combat casualties which now total about 400 dead and 2,000 wounded in 4½ years of limited fighting will grow considerably as the meat grinder of day-in, day-out combat begins to turn.

Such a prospect is black indeed, but it does not appear to us that there is any way to avoid it, short of surrendering the nation we have been defending to communism. President Johnson's appeals for negotiations have fallen on deaf ears and apparently nothing but a real war effort on our part is going to bring the Communists to an agreement to halt their efforts to take over this country.

Strength—from the time of Lenin down to today—has been the only thing that Communist leaders have understood and feared, and in this time in point the strength quite obviously is in the hands of the United States. The question has been whether we intend to use it, and Johnson's answer is clearly that we do.

The above chart shows that we have more than doubled the number of fighting men we have in South Vietnam in the past 6 months. The Allen-Scott report across the page says the Joint Chiefs of Staff want to double the number again.

Reports of troop movements through Hawaii and from Okinawa appear from day to day, and it could be that a great deal more is taking place than we are aware of. Reference to Korean and Nationalist China offers of troops in large numbers add to the picture an aura of impending bloodshed.

Actions taken 2 weeks in Australia and New Zealand, both of whom announced they would send combat units to South Vietnam, indicate some success has been achieved by Henry Cabot Lodge in convincing our allies that we need help to carry on against the Communist effort to dominate southeast Asia.

The Australian and New Zealander contingents, totaling about 1,000 men, are small, but the important thing is that they are committed—and committed to combat rather than the halfway role of advisers.

Part of the reason that America's long involvement in South Vietnam has not met with success stems from the fact that both President Eisenhower and the late President Kennedy persisted in calling our forces "advisers" to the confusion of no one except the American public and our allies, neither of which has yet to face up to the significance of the fact that there is a war going on in Vietnam.

One of President Kennedy's first acts of office was to call in Gen. Maxwell Taylor who put together the concept of fighting a limited war in Vietnam, largely with Special Forces units, and a great deal of propaganda was put out which made the Vietnam problem look like a little one.

Vietnam has never been a small problem. There has been consistent warfare of one description or another going on there ever since 1941, and it is quite obviously in more of a mess than any other spot in the world.

The error in Vietnam, which now appears ready to take many American lives, has been that we have allowed this situation to continue to fester in hopes that some kind of miraculous event would take place and cure it. Miracles do take place, even in international politics, but unfortunately none has occurred in Vietnam.

In the cold war which America has fought with communism since the close of World War II, no more serious threat has existed to our position than the one we face in Vietnam. Korea was a bigger, bloodier battle, but there was no question about our ability and commitment to win it from the minute President Truman ordered troops to defend the South Korean Republic.

In Vietnam there have been questions about our commitment—not our abilities—to defend that republic, and it now appears

that we are ready to remove those doubts even if it takes a great deal of American blood to do so.

## L.B.J. Task: Trying Not To Use Power

### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. J. J. PICKLE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1965

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, one of the most delightful journalists in our city, amply endowed with beauty, brains, and personality, has written an article recently in the New York Journal-American about President Johnson.

Marianne Means is highly regarded as a journalist, author and friend to many officials in Washington, and her article in the Journal-American of May 30, 1965, is a penetrating and accurate narrative of our President.

The article follows:

[From the New York Journal-American, May 30, 1965]

L.B.J. TASK: TRYING NOT TO USE POWER  
(By Marianne Means)

AUSTIN, TEXAS—President Johnson is a colossus. He stands in his size 12 Oxfords firmly astride the administration, the Congress, and the economy.

In the Capital there is no doubt that he is the boss. No problem is too big for him, or too small. He is as willing to devote an hour discussing a petty irritation with a Senator as he is to personally selecting the raid targets on North Vietnam from a checkerboard-sized colored map brought to him just before bedtime.

The impression in the country is understandably one of a man of immense power, ordering Cabinet members and labor leaders about at will, demanding—and getting—whatever he wants.

Yet an essential element is missing from this picture of Johnson, the President. For the secret of his ability to get effective results from the vague powers of the Presidency is his conscientious restraint about the use of those powers.

Ironically, ambitious lesser men spend most of their time officiously throwing their weight around. But the President, in the most potentially powerful job in all the free world, sighed the other day, "I spend all my time trying not to exercise my power."

The President believes that men who exert their authority brashly only anger their targets and in the end, as he put it, "may win the argument but lose the sale."

This correspondent has personal knowledge of several occasions when the President was called upon to solve a difference of opinion between two Cabinet members, or a Cabinet member and a Senator, or a prominent private industry figure and a White House adviser.

Each time the President could easily have dispensed with the matter in a few minutes. But instead he carefully spent hours seeking to persuade both sides that what he had already determined was the wise course, was after all in the best interest of each. And in every case, the President's decision did grant some surcease to each side.

The President has a story which he tells to illustrate the values of friendly persuasion and a respect for the opponent's case.

He recalls that one day when he was a young school teacher in Houston he and the football coach strolled across the school-

ground at lunchtime, puffing on cigarettes and leaving a big cloud of smoke in their wake. The school superintendent stopped them and asked them not to smoke at the school because they were setting a bad example for the students.

The President promptly agreed to comply but the coach was indignant that the superintendent would try to interfere with his personal rights. The next day in the school cafeteria the coach lit up a big, black cigar.

Predictably, the superintendent in anger called the coach into his office. The coach insisted that he was sorry but he was merely asserting his right as an individual to do what he pleased.

The superintendent leaned back in his chair and rubbed his hands together. "Well, in that case," he told the coach, "I will merely assert my right as an individual and do what I please—and I please not to pick up your contract for next year."

## LAW RELATIVE TO THE PRINTING OF DOCUMENTS

Either House may order the printing of a document not already provided for by law, but only when the same shall be accompanied by an estimate from the Public Printer as to the probable cost thereof. Any executive department, bureau, board or independent office of the Government submitting reports or documents in response to inquiries from Congress shall submit therewith an estimate of the probable cost of printing the usual number. Nothing in this section relating to estimates shall apply to reports or documents not exceeding 50 pages (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 140, p. 1938).

Resolutions for printing extra copies, when presented to either House, shall be referred immediately to the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, who, in making their report, shall give the probable cost of the proposed printing upon the estimate of the Public Printer, and no extra copies shall be printed before such committee has reported (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 133, p. 1937).

## GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS FOR SALE

Additional copies of Government publications are offered for sale to the public by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, at cost thereof as determined by the Public Printer plus 50 percent: *Provided*, That a discount of not to exceed 25 percent may be allowed to authorized bookdealers and quantity purchasers, but such printing shall not interfere with the prompt execution of work for the Government. The Superintendent of Documents shall prescribe the terms and conditions under which he may authorize the resale of Government publications by bookdealers, and he may designate any Government officer his agent for the sale of Government publications under such regulations as shall be agreed upon by the Superintendent of Documents and the head of the respective department or establishment of the Government (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 72a, Supp. 2).

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It shall be lawful for the Public Printer to print and deliver upon the order of any Senator, Representative, or Delegate, extracts from the Congressional Record, the person ordering the same paying the cost thereof (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 185, p. 1942).

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We must not be lured by quick and easy solutions.

We must not abandon our goals because of frustration.

We must continue to pursue the goal of peace and freedom—acknowledging both the prospects of success and the consequences of failure.

In this task, I ask your help.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the speech of the Vice President was a speech, for the most part, in defense of the administration's undeclared war in South Vietnam. I would have the Record show that I thoroughly disagree with the major points of view of the Vice President of the United States, as well as with those of the President himself. Nevertheless, it was a great honor for us to have the Vice President of the United States as a guest in our State.

He not only spoke at the conference of western Governors, but he also spoke at two very important gatherings, partisan in nature, involving the Democratic Party in my State.

I want to say, as the senior Senator from Oregon—and I am sure I speak in behalf of all the party leaders of my State—that we are very appreciative to the Vice President of the United States for his speeches at those meetings, and, incidentally, for the campaign funds that he helped us to raise in both of those fundraising party affairs.

Mr. President, one of the things that I appreciate so much about the Vice President is that we can disagree with him and still have a high regard for him. I have always found that he reciprocates in regard to a mutuality of understanding that prevails between himself and those with whom he disagrees, and with those who disagree with him.

I thank the Vice President for going to Oregon. It was my privilege, several weeks ago, in behalf of the State chairman of the Democratic Party, as well as a good many of the county chairmen and members of the State central committee of the Democratic Party in Oregon to urge the Vice President to address the party meetings to which I have referred during his stay in Oregon. He accepted the invitation to go to Oregon in order to address the western Governors' conference.

I also thank him for participating in our annual Rose Parade, which was held last Saturday, one of the great fiestas of our country. I am sure all Oregonians appreciate the compliment the Vice President paid our people by his very presence there.

VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I turn now to another matter.

I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an article entitled "Johnson Policies: A Survey of Support" written by Tom Wicker and published in this morning's New York Times.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

JOHNSON POLICIES: A SURVEY OF SUPPORT AT

HOME AND ABROAD

(By Tom Wicker)

WASHINGTON, June 13.—Eight months after his massive election victory, President Johnson is holding much of his support among the American people, but his leadership in foreign policy is being sharply questioned in Washington and abroad.

An uneasiness that began when the war in Vietnam was expanded last August has been increased by the intervention in the Dominican revolution and the decision to commit ground troops to fight in southeast Asia.

These actions appeared to have wide support among the public. Mr. Johnson's popularity remains high in all known polls, and last week the western Governors' conference adopted a resolution supporting his conduct of foreign policy.

Most indications are that the powerful business community and organized labor also remain squarely behind the President.

But the American academic world has made it plain—through speeches, teach-ins, and countless letters to newspaper editors—that it is intellectually and emotionally alienated from the President, to whom it gave such strong support in the election.

There also is increasing—and mutual—hostility between the President and many segments of the press, his most constant means of communication with the Nation and the world.

Criticism in official Washington has been muted, primarily because Members of Congress and administration officials have no wish either to offend Mr. Johnson or to give the world an impression of a divided Government—an impression that would be more apparent than real since there is as yet nothing approaching an open revolt against the President's leadership.

But intensive interviewing in Washington justifies the following conclusions:

Many Democratic Members of Congress are restive and unhappy, both over Mr. Johnson's Vietnamese and Dominican policies and over what they regard as his high-handed manner of making and carrying out decisions in foreign affairs. Some moderate Republicans share these feelings. Conservative members in both parties support the President strongly.

The State Department, theoretically the President's foreign policy arm, is shot through with dismay at a Dominican operation—centered in the White House—that many diplomats and Foreign Service officers regard as having lacked subtlety and finesse and as having exhibited both philosophical and operational confusion in the making of foreign policy.

Since the American President is the leader of the Western World, most foreign governments rooted unashamedly for Mr. Johnson to defeat Barry Goldwater, a candidate they considered reactionary and reckless.

Spot checks by correspondents of the New York Times disclosed that many of them now are apprehensive about Mr. Johnson's use of national power, and what it portends in crises to come, and disturbed by what they think is a lack of consultation and diplomatic courtesy in Washington.

Similar checks of opinion in the United States confirm that Mr. Johnson's support remains strong in this country, despite academic concern.

These checks also disclosed that many of those who supported Mr. Goldwater last year now admire Mr. Johnson's foreign policy and that some moderates and liberals are dismayed by it.

Here are some of the findings of the Times interviews and opinion checks, in Washington and elsewhere:

Members of Congress, particularly Senators closely interested in foreign affairs, privately voice fears that Mr. Johnson's skills in domestic politics have been shown to desert him when he looks abroad. This, they believe, is partly because foreign problems are not necessarily responsive to Presidential power and are not always reducible to "solutions," and thus frustrate the President rather than satisfy what they think is his appetite for achievement.

These legislators also are disturbed that the President, who in domestic affairs habitually seeks advice from all sides, now seems to them to be relying on a tight group of foreign affairs advisers and giving little regard to the views of others—particularly critical views.

#### IRRITATED BY LECTURES

This group of Senators was encouraged recently, however, when a dominantly Congressional initiative for increased emphasis on economic aid to South Vietnam was taken up by Mr. Johnson. As an almost direct result, he quickly announced and sent to Congress a request for an initial appropriation of \$89 million to begin aid projects in South Vietnam.

These Members remain concerned by what they regard as signs of "tension and strain" in the President in recent anxious weeks, and they are irritated by his habit of lecturing them at length in private sessions. A typical meeting of that kind lasted 4 hours one morning recently, and on another occasion a leading Senator attempted to slip out unseen—only to be called back from the door by the President.

Some Senators also detect signs of impulsive action, which they do not ordinarily associate with the careful, shrewd, domestic politician they came to know so well when he was the Senate majority leader.

On the night of the Dominican intervention on April 28, for instance, Mr. Johnson brought a bipartisan group of congressional leaders to his White House office for a briefing. He passed around a statement that he said he was about to make on television.

One of the Members of Congress expressed surprise that there was nothing in the statement about the Organization of American States.

Mr. Johnson handed the document to Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

"Here, Dean," he said, "put in something about the OAS."

A leading Democratic Senator, who is highly critical in private, summed up his objections to the Dominican operation almost entirely in terms of hasty actions—too many troops sent too quickly and without proper notification to the OAS; too many peace-making missions sent or encouraged; too much reliance on unconfirmed intelligence about Communist involvement.

Many Members of Congress also are annoyed at what they think are Johnsonian devices to mute or snuff out congressional criticism and debate. His request for a \$700 million appropriation for Vietnam was widely regarded as a request for a "blank check" made under circumstances in which most Members could not afford to oppose it.

When the State Department and the White House made it clear last week that American ground troops could fight side by side with the South Vietnamese, under certain circumstances, there was a brief outburst on the Senate floor. Many Members felt that such a commitment of American troops went beyond any authorization that had been voted for the President. They felt that the decision came dangerously close to involving the United States in a land war in Asia, without a declaration of war by Congress.

When Senators and others discuss these matters with Mr. Johnson in closed session,



Mr. Johnson takes the attitude that since Members of Congress do not have all the information available to him they should stop criticizing his actions.

Many Members of Congress are shocked at the vitriolic criticism Mr. Johnson has directed at the press, particularly over the reporting from Santo Domingo. Senator Mike Mansfield, of Montana, the majority leader, recently spoke publicly in defense of the press and warned against "deprecating, in the name of national policy or of a superior governmental wisdom, the free press, which is one of the principal institutions by which freedom is maintained."

To many in Washington, in and out of the press, Mr. Johnson's anger over unfavorable articles about his policies in Vietnam and particularly in the Dominican Republic, his vigorous pursuit of favorable articles, and his willingness to allow himself and his subordinates to spend hours in justifying their policies suggest defensiveness and an uneasy awareness that things are not going well.

Members of Congress believe that some of the lengthy and insistent briefings Mr. Johnson has held for their benefit also arose from his politician's sense of their growing restiveness.

At the State Department, privately expressed concern and dismay are as apparent as in Congress.

When it was suggested to one official at the height of the Dominican crisis that a high State Department administrator should take steps to revive the morale of his staff, the reply was: "Who's going to cheer him up?"

During the Dominican operation even some high officials were dismayed by Mr. Johnson's long lectures, by all-night meetings that were physically taxing to him and others, by what they considered an excessive concern for domestic political repercussions and by a seeming unwillingness to hear criticism. They were also dismayed by what they thought was the overinvolvement of "the top of the Government"—the President, the Secretary of State and Defense, etc.—in operational details to the detriment of broader strategic and policy concepts.

As a byproduct of this involvement, particularly the 10-day absence from Washington of the President's special assistant, McGeorge Bundy—there also were indications of a temporary drop in attention to the problem of Vietnam, which is universally considered in the State Department to be much more important.

Mr. Rusk also is criticized by his subordinates. Many of them believe he shares some of their feelings and points to indications that he sought to dissociate himself from some of the judgments in the Dominican operation. But they think his attitudes and actions were not strong enough to exert a correcting influence on events.

Various officials also point to what they think were slacks and competing performances by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Dominican Republic, and they feel that Mr. Johnson accepted information from these agencies too willingly.

Interviews by Times correspondents abroad indicated rising concern in foreign capitals, too, over Mr. Johnson's attitude.

In Latin America, complaints were heard not only about intervention, per se, in the Dominican Republic, but also about the manner in which it was being conducted.

Officials of various shades of opinion say the situation was made worse by the lack of a clear U.S. policy once the intervention was made. They felt it would have been better to carry the operation through forcefully than to vacillate between sides and let a deadlock develop.

#### JAPANESE FIND FAULT

In Tokyo, officials who have little to say about Vietnam—a situation closer to them—have been busy for some time. An anonymous Japanese term to describe a manager of proposing singlehandedly without regard to principles, support or advice.

In New Delhi, to some extent and in some quarters, the Johnson policies in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic are compared with what is regarded as his clumsy handling of the postponement of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's visit to Washington. Officials expressing this view fear a bullheadedness in Mr. Johnson's actions.

Rome, London, Ottawa, and Rome reflect official support for the President, but an undercurrent of private concern. Officials in these capitals feel that Mr. Johnson's role in Santo Domingo on the basis of what seemed to them to be inadequate information. They are worried about his lack of consultation with them on that and other actions, and about the "quality" of his total performance in foreign affairs.

Thus, the staid Financial Times of London commented: "What is worrying in the [Dominican] situation is not so much that an error of judgment was committed, but that it was one which, because of his approach to foreign policy, the President may be liable to repeat."

#### AND SO BE CALVIN KENNEDY

In France, even officials disposed to closer ties with the United States are saying that the Vietnamese and Dominican actions vindicate President de Gaulle's contention that since the United States can use its power unilaterally, its allies are entitled to do the same.

Even in Moscow, a correspondent reported, some officials are in near despair as they look at the future of Soviet-United States relations. Mr. Johnson seems to these men to be acting more like Mr. Goldwater than like John F. Kennedy.

Spot checks in this country by correspondents confirmed the evident loss of support for Mr. Johnson in the academic world. They also disclosed a feeling of frustration among Americans at the difficulty of understanding and getting information on complex foreign situations and the Nation's involvement in them.

Most noticeable was the shift of Goldwater supporters to Mr. Johnson's side and the drop in support among liberals and moderates.

The President lost Georgia in last fall's elections, for instance, but checks of opinion there now indicate an upsurge of support for him.

This apparently stems from a conviction that he is a "hard man" in foreign policy, extracting little from Communists.

John M. Mure, a rightist in Detroit, said that "Johnson is doing some of the things Goldwater wanted to do." Mrs. Dorothy Beger, a secretary in Atlanta, had what looking the Marine to Santo Domingo had prevented. "Another Cuban crisis," she added. "He's doing everything that Goldwater advocated."

#### MILWAUKEE APPROVE

A Miami correspondent reported similarly that it was "difficult to find someone who does not approve of President Johnson's stand in the Dominican Republic."

In Los Angeles, divergent opinions were reported, particularly on whether there had been an active Communist threat in the Dominican Republic. Most Angelenos seemed there was such a threat and support Mr. Johnson's actions.

Three sets of reactions were reported from San Francisco. The largest group of those interviewed indicated they were generally baffled by international affairs, but they said

they believed "the President must know more than we know."

Another group, including former Goldwater supporters and members of Democratic and Republican parties, was correct in getting "tough with those Communists."

But California's liberals, the San Francisco checks showed, are dismayed with Mr. Johnson and are searching for useful political means to attack him. As a result, former Republican Mayor George Christopher is saying that he sees a possibility of an even worse breach than is customary in the California Democratic Party.

A leading California liberal said he and others were particularly disturbed at reports that Mr. Johnson had relied heavily on FBI reports from Santo Domingo—reports that apparently raised the specter of McCarthyism in some minds.

#### RAY OF HOPE RECALLED

But from Seattle it was reported: "The jailing of Cuba still smarts in most quarters. Therefore, the vocal part of the public in this area not only supports the President in Santo Domingo, but also expresses indignation. That is a feeling that this is a forthright way, an atonement for the Bay of Pigs."

Chicagoans interviewed expressed overwhelming approval of the intervention, held a correspondent reported that "almost without exception they mentioned Cuba and the need to avoid a repetition of our mistakes there."

In New York, spokesmen for major corporations said they had heard nothing to indicate that business executives were worried about administration policy. And a labor spokesman said that, with few exceptions, union leaders were supporting the President.

From Louisville, "an uneasiness among responsible members of this community" was reported. "This uneasiness, however," the correspondent continued, "is tempered by an indecision over just what course of action should be taken."

"We can't convince people that our way is right by using a pistol," said Lyman T. Johnson, a teacher in a downtown Louisville high school.

In Boston, even less support for Mr. Johnson was found. Phrases like "Frank T. Spark on the trigger" and "leaps without looking" were heard. The interviewer concluded that the prevailing opinion appears to be a mixture of at best mild approval for what Mr. Johnson has done and some nodding about the way he has done it.

A Boston lawyer, a Democrat, said he found in the President a "paradox between his style in foreign and domestic policies." "He has infinite patience, on the one hand, and a terrible lack of it in conducting foreign policy," he said, "but this is not something new, either as an American trait or for Johnson."

Mr. MORSE, Mr. President, is a very objective analyst of the conflict in American public opinion that is developing over the Johnson program of making war, without a declaration of war, in Asia, sending increasing numbers of American boys to their deaths, and unjustifiably and unnecessarily so, in an undeclared war, following a course of action that is creating a great threat to the peace of the world and a source of action which, in the opinion of the Senate, is headed from Oregon, is headed straight toward a third world war unless the American public—and only the American public can do it—makes perfectly clear to the President of the United States that the policy he is following will end up, as I said a few moments ago, in his complete repudiation.

After the French suffered 290,000 casualties in Indochina, the French people made clear to the French Government that they rejected that Government and that Government fell, just as this Government is going to fall if it becomes responsible for leading the country into a third world war.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the Congressional Record another article from this morning's New York Times entitled "Religious Issues Revived in Saigon—Buddhists and Catholics Vie for Power in New Regime," written by Seymour Topping.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MOWALL in the chair). Is there objection?

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

RELIGIOUS ISSUES REVIVED IN SAIGON—BUDDHISTS AND CATHOLICS VIE FOR POWER IN NEW REGIME

(By Seymour Topping)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, June 13.—A new struggle for political influence developed today between militant Roman Catholic and Buddhist factions as military leaders sought to form a government.

Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, acting as spokesman for the military leaders who took control of the Government yesterday promised the nation a war government dedicated to unity, discipline, and victory over the Vietcong.

His declaration, delivered in a broadcast, failed to dispel the malaise taking hold of the capital.

A new "political action committee," headed by the Catholic leaders whose pressure led to the resignation of Premier Phan Huy Quat, declared that it would fight any "religious monopoly." It also called for the establishment of a strong government, military or civilian, that would prosecute the war against the Communists vigorously.

In a warning to the military leaders, the committee said the Catholics would not tolerate any government that showed favoritism to the political militant Unified Buddhist Church.

The Catholics were joined in their declaration by the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects and by southern Buddhists of the Vietnamese General Buddhist Church.

Militant Catholics, led by Rev. Hoang Quynh, take the position that they have attained only the initial objective of their program by toppling the Quat government.

Premier Quat had been accused of a multiplicity of offenses, including favoritism to Buddhists, discrimination against Catholics, and failure to press the war against the Vietcong.

SOME CHARGES VAGUE

The vagueness of some of the charges recalled the ones leveled by Buddhists against former Premier Tran Van Huong, who was unseated January 27. An interim period of military control followed until 4 months ago, when Mr. Quat became Premier.

As their next objective, Father Quynh and his organization, the Central Movement of the Catholic struggle, want to see the installation of a government sympathetic to their objectives. The organization is demanding a government that will assure the country's 1.7 million Catholics a voice equal in all respects to that of the larger number of Buddhists. Catholics make up about 10 percent of the population.

In the political consultations among military leaders, Catholics are trying to avert any

bid for power by a group of young officers who are regarded as linked to Thich Tri Quang, controversial leader of the United Buddhist Church.

The officers are Brig. Gen. Nguyen Phan Thieu, commander of the army's I Corps area; Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, commander of the air force and Lt. Col. Pham Van Lieu, the Saigon police chief.

#### MILITARY DOMINANCE SEEN

The setup of Saigon's new government is expected to be one that will assure military dominance for a period.

U.S. officials have voiced hope that General Thieu, a Roman Catholic from central Vietnam who served as Defense Minister under Premier Quat, will be selected to head the new administration.

The 42-year-old general is regarded as a moderate who might be acceptable to all factions.

The Catholics are prepared to back him because of his religion, and the Buddhists are believed willing to accept him tentatively since real power would reside in the young officers who command troops and who are sympathetic to them.

The Catholics say they are prepared for trouble, however, should the Buddhists come into the ascendancy.

Within the last year, under the leadership of Father Quynh, a priest in his later fifties with a long record of anti-Communist struggle, the Catholic movement has been strengthened for direct action. Catholics have been organized into self-defense units in many parishes throughout the country.

#### PARISH INFILTRATION

In 116 parishes in the Saigon area, youths are well organized, some with primitive weapons.

Father Quynh's organization has asserted that its agents have infiltrated the Saigon headquarters of the Unified Buddhist Church. They charge that the church, under Thich Tri Quang's influence, leans toward neutralism and may be willing to deal with the Communists.

Much of the Catholics' fear of a Vietcong takeover in South Vietnam is due to their harsh experience with Communists.

#### ABOUT 600,000 FLED IN 1954

About 600,000 of them fled to South Vietnam after the Geneva agreement of 1954, which accepted Communist control over the north. About half a million Catholics remain in the north, and many are prevented by the Communists from leaving, according to Catholics in the south.

Early in 1964, after the downfall and execution of President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was a Catholic, Catholic communities in central Vietnam came under attack, and about 17,000 Catholics became refugees. Catholics maintain that some Buddhists cooperated with the Vietcong guerrillas in repressing Catholics in central Vietnam.

The Central Movement of Catholic Struggle was formed June 7, 1964. It is a loosely organized group that gives parish priests a great deal of autonomy. Bishops and Vatican representatives have remained aloof from the political activities of the movement but have also quietly worked for it.

The movement's central committee publishes a biweekly newspaper, *Crux*, daily, with a circulation of 60,000—larger than that of any similar publication in the country.

Mr. MORSE: Mr. President, I have spoken on this topic a considerable number of times on the floor of the Senate. It is one of those subjects that most people do not like to hear discussed, but let me make the record clear again that

we cannot exclude from the war in South Vietnam the religious issue. I happen to be one who believes that we cannot justify killing a single American boy in a war that has involved in it as one of the major issues the religious question. Let the South Vietnamese settle their own religious differences. Let the Buddhists and Catholics settle their own religious differences in South Vietnam. Here is one Senator who is not going to vote to kill a single American boy in South Vietnam over a civil war that involves in part a conflict between Catholics and Buddhists.

#### SANTO DOMINGO

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the Congressional Record another article appearing in this morning's New York Times, entitled "U.S. Aid Gloomy on OAS Mission—Vaughn Says Three-Man Team in Santo Domingo Has Made Little Progress," written by Richard Eder.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

U.S. AID GLOOMY ON OAS MISSION—VAUGHN SAYS THREE-MAN TEAM IN SANTO DOMINGO HAS MADE LITTLE PROGRESS

(By Richard Eder)

WASHINGTON, June 13.—A State Department official said today that the three-man mission of the Organization of American States in the Dominican Republic had made little progress toward a political solution there.

In one of the gloomiest public assessments to date by an administration figure, Jack Hood Vaughn, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, said that after 10 days of talks between the mission's members and the rival Dominican groups "We apparently aren't much closer to a coalition arrangement than we were when they arrived."

Mr. Vaughn added:

"It is going to take a long time to reach an understanding and perhaps even after an understanding is reached, it is going to be even more difficult to force it upon the Dominican people, which I think is going to be the last and perhaps the most difficult hurdle that we have to contend with."

#### CHANNEL FOR U.S. EFFORT

Reached by telephone later, Mr. Vaughn stressed that the lack of progress so far was a result of the complexity of the Dominican situation. "I believe that the Sunkers mission is just getting started," he said.

The members of the mission are Ellsworth Barker, of the United States; Ramon de Clairmont Duane, of El Salvador, and Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil.

Although the peace mission was sent by the OAS, it also represented the major vehicle for U.S. diplomatic efforts to settle the Dominican crisis.

Officials here have been concerned over the last week about the mission's lack of progress. One official said that neither the junta nor the rebels appeared to feel under pressure to make concessions.

The rebels, led by Col. Francisco Caamaño Deso, insist on a return to the 1963 constitution and a provisional government to serve out the remainder of the term of Juan Bosch, who was deposed from the Presidency in 1963.

The junta, headed by Brig. Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera, insists on discarding this Constitution, which contains controversial provisions on education and control of subversive activities, in favor of a Constitution drawn up in 1963.

The two sides also disagree about the makeup of any provisional government and about the leadership of the armed forces.

Mr. Vaughn, who was interviewed on the American Broadcasting Co. television program, "Issues and Answers," said that Dominican Communists were still active on the side of the rebels although some, he said, had left the rebel zone and moved into the interior. Some Communist leaders were still providing advice to the rebel leadership, he said, and others were commanding rebel military groups.

He expressed the belief that neither General Imbert nor Colonel Caamaño had overwhelming popular support. He indicated that the United States would be reluctant to see either prevail.

#### BOTH SIDES OMBULATE

(By Juan de Onis)

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, June 13.—The United States is being frustrated in its search for a political settlement by the intransigence of the rival factions and its own inhibitions.

After 7 weeks of bloodshed, fear, and economic disruption, the Dominican crisis has settled into what appears to be an endurance contest between the junta and the rebels, with the United States in between to prevent any decisive new fighting.

"We don't want to impose a solution," said a U.S. official here. "We want the Dominicans to work out a settlement, with our help, that reflects national opinion."

Diplomatic observers believe that a protracted period of negotiations, subject to many pitfalls, lies ahead. One pitfall could be an outbreak of rebel action in the interior.

As these negotiations go forward under OAS auspices, the will, endurance, and cohesion of both factions will be tested. In the meantime, enforcement of the cease-fire will require the continuing presence here of U.S. military elements in the inter-American peace force, since little further support from Latin American countries is expected.

This is a prospect that does not please the 7,500 men of the U.S. 82d Airborne Division, who remain in the force manning the international zone in Santo Domingo and the security corridor dividing the city and separating the factions.

After more than 40 days here, the U.S. forces often reply with an affirmative "Si, Si" when a Dominican shouts "Yankee, go home."

Patience is the long suit of Ellsworth Bunker. The U.S. member of the OAS mission, who is 71 years old, devoted 7 months to the negotiations ending hostilities between Indonesia and the Netherlands over western New Guinea.

Mr. Bunker insists that the United States does not have a readymade formula for a settlement and he even refuses to "think out loud" about a formula at this time.

The mediators' exploratory talks with both factions and scores of civic leaders, businessmen, clergymen, and representatives of professional and labor groups have revealed that public opinion is deeply split.

There are pressures on both sides that may reduce the intransigence of both sides and strengthen moderate elements.

The junta, which is backed by the military and the police, survives on financial help from the United States, which pays military and civil service payrolls. The United States also provides free food for the 300,000 unemployed in the junta zone.

As for the rebels, they are pocketed in a corner of this capital. They are safe in the

sanctuary provided by the inter-American peace force, and they have food, fuel, and armament for a long siege. But it is not a self-sustaining economic situation, and both the powerplant and the waterworks are under OAS control.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, before the week is over I shall speak at greater length in regard to the very unsound policy the United States has followed in the Dominican Republic, but for tonight I have inserted the Eder article, and I also ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the Record an editorial from this morning's New York Times entitled "While Santo Domingo Sleeps."

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### WHILE SANTO DOMINGO SLEEPS

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has chosen a proper subject and proper timing in deciding to review United States actions in the Dominican Republic. It has been clear almost from the beginning that Washington's policy was at least dubious if not gravely in error. The controversy is not over sending troops to protect and evacuate Americans, but over the role the United States played and is still playing in Dominican internal politics.

In the beginning, Senators were faced with a crisis they knew nothing about. They had no choice but to go along with President Johnson. Now that the situation in the Dominican Republic is in a state of paralysis, the Senate can investigate without fear that it may be obstructing a solution.

In Santo Domingo itself, the Organization of American States now has the task of picking up the pieces. Its Inter-American Force is keeping order; it is trying to find a political solution; it is handling the government's finances, feeding the public, investigating charges of torture, and even running a newspaper and radio station.

This unaccustomed role for the OAS is an important but confusing development in hemispheric affairs. There is no possibility of gauging whether the Dominican experiment will prove unique or whether it has set a precedent that will be followed in future crises. One problem is that some of the most important members—Mexico, Chile and Peru, for instance—do not favor the OAS role. Another is that many Latin Americans feel the OAS was called in belatedly to get the United States out of its self-induced predicament. A deep-seated objection to any outside interference in the internal affairs of a Latin nation is a third source of disquiet.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, through its inquiry, may help establish some useful guidelines for relationships between the United States and the OAS so that the likelihood of unilateral American military action in future crises will be reduced. The security of the Inter-American system will be enhanced by such guidelines.

#### NEWS CURB ON VIETNAM BATTLE

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that there be inserted in the Record an article from this morning's Washington Post, a similar article having appeared in a good many other newspapers today, entitled "News Curb Imposed on Vietnam Battle—Commitment of GI's Weighed as Fight Rages at Dong Xoai."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### NEWS CURB IMPOSED ON VIET BATTLE—COMMITMENT OF GI'S WEIGHED AS FIGHT RAGES AT DONG XOAI

(By Jack Folsie)

Saigon, June 13.—The American Embassy and U.S. military commanders sought to blackout all news of the renewed battle of Dong Xoai today, and asked correspondents not to report on American troop movements.

It was apparent that a major Vietcong threat remained at Dong Xoai, 60 miles north of Saigon—and that commitment of U.S. troops to the battle was being considered seriously.

American paratroopers were flown to an airbase at Phuoc Vinh, 30 miles south of Dong Xoai, for offensive action against the Vietcong. United Press International reported.

Units of the 173d Airborne Brigade were removed from their defensive positions at the Bien Hoa airbase near Saigon, and were reported to be digging in at Phuoc Vinh.

U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor returned to Saigon early Monday from a visit to Washington where he conferred with President Johnson and other officials on the course of the war, the Associated Press reported.

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. military commander, and Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson conferred about the battle tonight.

The Vietcong forces, after inflicting losses of 600 dead or missing on 2 government battalions, withdrew Friday. But they came smashing back Saturday, attacking part of a South Vietnamese airborne battalion in bivouac at a rubber plantation 2 miles north of Dong Xoai.

The fate of that paratrooper outfit was being withheld by American military spokesmen, other than to confirm that the situation became so critical that the unit's three American advisers were flown out by helicopter.

A spokesman said that the American command still had no estimate of the Vietnamese losses. However, he was able to report that American pilots had estimated Vietcong losses from air strikes alone at 250 dead.

Eight Navy Skyhawk jets raked the Vietcong assembly area today 6 miles west of Dong Xoai with cannon fire, rockets, bombs, and possibly napalm. An observation pilot estimated the dead at 250, reportedly counted as he circled low over the target area.

Losses, on both sides, total at least 1,500 dead since Thursday, witnesses reported.

In the mopping-up action since the Vietcong abandoned the town Friday, several more bodies of U.S. personnel have been recovered. It was announced that at least 7 Americans were killed, 15 were wounded, and 11 are still missing.

Noncombat accidents swelled the U.S. casualty toll Saturday and today. Three American marines died in the explosion of a truck near Danang in the northeastern sector, and 18 were wounded in the same blast. Details were lacking.

Four American helicopter crewmen died when their craft crashed in a rainstorm late Saturday 30 miles east of Saigon.

Casualties suffered by Vietnamese paratroopers mauled in the renewed Vietcong attack near Dong Xoai were heavy, and only a score or so of the 500-plus men in the unit have straggled to their base in the town.

Saturday's attack was made by a reported force of 500 Vietcong, the spokesman said. He described the fighting as "heavy," and said American fighter-bomber aircraft were diverted from other missions to enter the fray.

The spokesman said an F-105 American jet was shot down by ground fire. Though the pilot was initially reported dead, he parachuted into a wooded area.

Two helicopter crewmen attempted a rescue but were driven off by heavy Vietcong fire.

They reported that they saw the pilot seized and carried off by the Vietcong.

From this point on, the U.S. military spokesman had no information about the Dong Xoai battle, and it appeared that an official news blackout had begun.

It has been apparent for some time that the American high command is not only grappling with their belief that the immediate situation requires censorship—but they are also worried about how to lessen the impact of casualties and defeats, as well as victories, when American troops go into action here.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I want to use this article as the transition for a further answer on my part to the suggestion made by the Senator from Illinois, the minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN], a few minutes ago on the floor of the Senate, about protesting the protesters.

The Senator from Illinois is entitled to his view. He is welcome to it so far as the senior Senator from Oregon is concerned. I am always delighted to dissociate myself from most of the views of the Senator from Illinois on most matters, but I particularly want to file a caveat of exceptions to the philosophy that was imbedded in the speech that the Senator from Illinois made a few minutes ago on the floor of the Senate.

When he was through waving that flag, there was not a shred left to it, which, as I have said so many times, is no way to respect the flag. He suggested on the floor of the Senate, by clear implication, if not by direct statement, that those of us who are protesting our Government's foreign policy in South Vietnam, some way, somehow, are disloyal to American boys, as he said, fighting in the muck and mire of the jungles of South Vietnam.

Who put them there? Not those of us who are protesting it. Who is to assume responsibility for it? Lyndon B. Johnson. He is the Commander in Chief. He is the one who is ordering an escalation of this war, without a declaration of war. He is the one who should be held responsible by the American people for the killing of American boys in South Vietnam. And he will be held responsible.

I say to the Senator from Illinois that the Communists forbid criticism of their government. That is a police state, totalitarian device, although the Communists do not hesitate to criticize other governments. Truly free men prove their freedom by criticizing their own government when they honestly believe it is wrong. Free men do not permit the kind of Communist tactics that is being advocated in this country by a good many people in our Government—namely, that the protesters in the United States should be silenced as the Communists silence protesters in their countries.

Here is one Senator who will take whatever action those who are attempting to silence us take, if the protesters prevail, but I will not be silenced.

The most dangerous and desperate men in the world are men connected with the U.S. Pentagon. History will record, long after we are gone, that it was

the Pentagon, under the leadership of McNamara—assisted by Taylor and Henry Cabot Lodge and the Bundys and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that wrote the blueprint that brought us to the midst of an undeclared, unjustifiable, unconstitutional war in South Vietnam.

The people are beginning to protest from coast to coast. The people are beginning to be heard.

I warn them that when those first 2,000 coffins with dead American boys in them come back to the States, they will know what a protest is. They are coming back. They are going to come back by the increasing thousands as this administration bogs an American military force down on the mainland of Asia.

Mr. President, the Senator from Illinois suggested that we ought to proceed now to appropriate \$100 million preparatory to making use of Chiang Kai-shek's forces in Asia. Then he decided to withdraw the amendment because, as I understood him—and the Record will speak for itself—he did not think it was necessary because, he said, he had talked to McNamara, and he had talked to Rusk, and he had talked to others, and he said he was assured the amendment would not be necessary to achieve the desired course of action.

Then he gave high praise to the military forces of Chiang Kai-shek. On the basis of the information I have received, I do not want to see American troops put behind them.

If they get into war, a large number of those American troops will be trampled to death as Chiang Kai-shek's forces retreat and run for cover. That will be the record of his forces. That corruptionist, the head of an illegal government on Formosa so far as approximately 7 million native Formosans are concerned, has already shaken down the American taxpayers for hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars, and has maintained in Formosa anything but freedom. Mr. President, for many years I have protested the course of action which the United States has followed in supporting this corruptionist. I intend to continue to protest the kind of proposal made by the Senator from Illinois this afternoon.

Put those Nationalist Chinese forces in Vietnam, and we will get the same reaction by an overwhelming majority of the South Vietnamese as if we put in the Communist Chinese.

South Vietnam is anti-Chinese. South Vietnam and the other countries of southeast Asia, but particularly South Vietnam, have fought the Chinese for a thousand years. We could not make a greater mistake than to believe that we would make it easier for the United States by sending the forces of our puppet on Formosa onto the mainland of China.

Of course, it might give the 7 million native Formosans an opportunity to recover their country, which the United States took away from them by putting the puppet Chiang Kai-shek in charge on Formosa.

As I said in 1955, together with Herbert Lehman, who led the fight with me on the floor against the Formosa doctrine, Formosa then did not belong to China.

It did not belong to Chiang Kai-shek. It did not belong to the United States. The question of its national sovereignty was in suspension. That is the phrase I used over and over in that debate, as Senators will discover if they will go back and read the Record.

I said then that we did not claim Formosa by conquest. Japan held Formosa by conquest and was the last country to have any international sovereign rights over Formosa. When the allies defeated Japan, we must remember that we never got together on what the disposal of the sovereignty of Formosa would be. Eventually, it will have to go to an international tribunal for determination.

Tonight I repeat—because it needs to be repeated—my answer to the Senator from Illinois, that Red China does not have sovereign rights over Formosa. Chiang Kai-shek does not have sovereign rights over Formosa. The United States does not have sovereign rights over Formosa. Of course, Japan lost hers when she was defeated.

Mr. President, I am at a loss to understand how it can be seriously proposed, but this is the kind of desperation and irresponsibility which flows out of the Pentagon.

I am at a loss to understand how it can be seriously proposed that we try to make use of Chiang Kai-shek's forces to join us in fighting the undeclared war in South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I am very much concerned, not for myself, but I am concerned about the attitude which has developed in the administration, trying to squelch, to silence, to censor those who do not agree with it.

I am at a loss to understand how in our history we could finally be subject to an administration which was following a news censorship policy in connection with the war in Asia.

We have gone through wars before, and the record of the great war correspondents who wrote the stories of those battles and engagements stands to the everlasting credit of the guarantee of a free press under the Constitution of the United States.

Yet, we are now in a war in which already the administration must assume the responsibility for denying access to American public opinion of uncensored stories from the American war correspondents in Asia.

I am glad, as I found out last Saturday afternoon, what a great Democrat in California and a great newspaperman, too, talked to me at some length about, and that is the growing concern in the editorial offices of a good many editors in this country, who have not yet started their protests but are making clear in their conversations among each other that they have had just about enough.

Let me say to the American editors: You have some good examples which have already been set for you. You have got those courageous editors of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch who have told us over and over again from the beginning of the desperate course of action followed by McNamara and his colleagues, who finally got Dean Rusk to wilt and accede, after, to all intents and purposes,



he had turned over the affairs of the Department of State to the Pentagon.

Secretary McNamara has been the Secretary of State for many months in Asia, so far as American foreign policies are concerned. Dean Rusk has been a "me-tooer" in regard to the course of action he has followed.

The editors of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch have had the courage to stand up and practice the guarantee of a free press under the Constitution of the United States. The New York Times, in editorial after editorial has refused to rubberstamp the propaganda of the administration in its shocking war in Asia. To the Knight papers I wish to express my deep appreciation for their courage in refusing to accept any muzzling by the administration.

There are other newspapers, too, including an editor of a small newspaper in York Pa., the York Gazette. It is too bad that the editorial policy of the York Gazette does not have the same wide circulation as that of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the New York Times, or the Knight papers, because that courageous editor of the little York Gazette in York, Pa., has called a spade a spade. He has not hesitated to make clear to his President that he will be no party to the program of bloodletting in Asia, that the President's policy is causing not only Americans, but also a good many other children of God to be suffering in Asia in this inexcusable war.

Let me say to the newspaper editors of America that they have a great challenge upon their patriotism. There is no greater challenge upon their patriotism in an hour of crisis than to insist that the Constitution be followed. However, there is nothing patriotic about scuttling the Constitution. There is nothing patriotic about not living up to all the safeguards of liberty guaranteed by the Constitution and promised to the American people.

My experiences in regard to the war in Vietnam convince me more and more that the President is only fooling himself if he thinks the polls that he is reading represent the grassroots of America.

This afternoon a colleague in the Senate who has never voted with me in the

position I have taken on the war in South Vietnam, who has gone along with the President on his votes, said to me—and he added that he had said it to a newspaperman, though I suspect that he said it off the record—that he was satisfied that an overwhelming majority of the Members of the Senate in private conversation make perfectly clear that they wish the President were not following the program that he is following in South Vietnam.

Speaking for myself, if all the colleagues who have come to me with great words of encouragement, telling me how much they appreciate the fact that I, along with the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING], have been making our protest now for almost 2 years in opposition to the men of desperation in the Pentagon, whose advice has taken over this administration, would vote as they encourage me in conversations, we would have stopped this course of action more than a year ago.

I do not give up hope that eventually Members of Congress will insist on a change in our country's foreign policy in Asia.

I commend the 28 Members of the House who have received deserved praise from Democrats who are protesting the policy of the Democratic Party, aided and abetted by the Republicans, with respect to the war in South Vietnam.

Senators should have heard the compliments that were paid them at a great mass meeting in Santa Monica last Saturday night by groups of organizations, a majority of which are Democratic Party organization groups, meeting in a huge rally in protest to the U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Mr. President, it will be interesting when the Republicans turn on the President. It is only a matter of time. They will find some basis, as they get nearer to 1966, to find themselves in disagreement with the President. In fact, we can see it coming now.

There is a little disappointment already that the President has not gone as far as they think Barry Goldwater would have gone.

In my opinion, he has already gone further than Goldwater would have

gone. Goldwater would not have had the kind of rubberstamp support the President has had. He would not have had the kind of majority that the President has had. That would have placed a check on him.

Be that as it may, I close this speech tonight by again saying that I intend to continue to protest the President's course of action in the absence of a declaration of war. I intend to continue to tell the American people, whenever I have the opportunity to do so, "You had better regain your control over American foreign policy. You had better make clear to the President of the United States that American foreign policy does not belong to him, but to you, the people. You had better make clear to the President that he ought to change his course of action so that we can bring to an end this undeclared war and get this dispute before an international conference table for an honorable negotiated settlement."

#### ADJOURNMENT

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 9 o'clock and 54 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday June 15, 1965, at 12 o'clock meridian.

#### NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate June 14, 1965:

##### U.S. MARSHAL

William Marion Parker, Jr., of Alabama, to be U.S. marshal for the middle district of Alabama for the term of 4 years. He is now serving in this office under an appointment which expired May 22, 1965.

John E. Maguire, Sr., of Florida, to be U.S. marshal for the middle district of Florida for the term of 4 years. He is now serving in this office under an appointment which expired May 8, 1965.

James E. Byrne, Jr., of New York, to be U.S. marshal for the northern district of New York for the term of 4 years. He is now serving in this office under an appointment which expired May 5, 1965.